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In this paper we estimate simple Taylor rules paying a particu-
lar attention to interest rate smoothing. Following English, Nelson,
and Sack (2002), we employ a model in ﬁrst diﬀerences to gain some
insights on the presence and signiﬁcance of the degree of partial ad-
justment. Moreover, we estimate a nested model to take both interest
rate smoothing and serially correlated deviations from various Taylor
rate prescriptions into account. Our ﬁndings suggest that the lagged
interest rate enters the Taylor rule in its own right, and may very well
coexist with a serially correlated policy shock. Asymmetric preferences
on the output gap level and ﬁnancial indicators turn out to be impor-
tant factors to understand Greenspan’s policy conduct. By contrast,
our ﬁndings support standard regressors for a ’European’ Taylor rule.
JEL classiﬁcation system: E4, E5.
Keywords: Taylor rules, omitted variables, serial correlation, inter-
est rate smoothing.
1 Introduction
Researchers involved in monetary policy analyses have been discussing about
the Taylor (1993) rule for a decade now. This simple rule, which links the
inﬂation rate and a measure of the output gap to the monetary policy rate,
has turned out to be a satisfactory approximation of the various Central
Banks’ policy conducts all over the world. In fact, numerous researchers
have focussed their attention on a modiﬁed Taylor rule, which reads as fol-
lows: it =( 1− ρ)
v
it +ρit−1,w i t hit identifying the short term nominal
1interest rate controlled by the Central Bank (CB henceforth), while
v
it is
the original Taylor rule, whose implied policy rate level has been termed
’Taylor rate’. The modiﬁed Taylor rule suggests a partial, gradual adjust-
ment to the Taylor rate after that a shock has hit the economy. Notably, the
estimated degree of partial adjustment ρ has typically turned out being very
high, then suggesting the existence of the so-termed interest rate smoothing,
or monetary policy inertia.1
Indeed, the literature has oﬀered various sensible reasons to interpret
the estimated policy gradualism.2 Nevertheless, Rudebusch (2002) criti-
cizes this conventional wisdom. In his stimulating contribution, he claims
that the interest rate smoothing at quarterly frequencies is just an illusion.
Rudebusch tests for the Partial Adjustment (PA hereafter) hypothesis, i.e.
the interest rate smoothing one, vs. the Serial Correlation (SC) alterna-
tive, which is related to persistent deviations of the policy variable from the
Taylor rate due to extraordinary episodes, such as shocks having a persis-
tent eﬀect on the economic system, or ﬁnancial turbolences. In Rudebusch’s
work, a direct prove of the existence of this illusion, based on the estimation
of Taylor rules admitting the smoothing component and an AR(1) process
for the error term, turns out to be not deﬁnitive.3 Then, the author goes
for an indirect proof. In a nutshell, his reasoning is the following: If the
partial adjustment strategy had such a high importance in the policy rate
setting, then rational agents should be capable to predict future values of
the quarterly rate with a high degree of precision. On the contrary, stan-
dard term structure regressions show how unpredictable the policy rate is
over one quarter. Rudebusch takes this evidence as convincing to claim that
the quarterly interest rate smoothing is just negligible, and that the per-
1Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999,2000) estimate such a partial adjustment degree with
various speciﬁcations of the Taylor rule with US data, ﬁnding a magnitude ' 0.8.T h e
same magnitude is found by Kozicki (1999), Amato and Laubach (1999), Domenéch,
Ledo, and Taguas (2002). Estimates for some other industrialized countries are oﬀered
by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998), Peersman and Smets (1999), Gerlach and Schnabel
(2000), and Domenéch, Ledo, and Taguas (2002). Notice that Amato and Laubach (1999)
estimate a slightly diﬀerent version of the modiﬁed Taylor rule, which is : it =
v
i t +ρit−1.
2Discussions concerning the interest rate smoothing issue may be found in Lowe and
Ellis (1998), Goodhart (1999), Sack and Wieland (2000), Cecchetti (2000), and Srour
(2001). In Section 2 we list some of the reasons why monetary policy gradualism may be
seen as an optimal strategy.
3High correlation in the Taylor rule’s regressors, their dynamic endogeneity, small
sample bias, and uncertainty about the appropriate arguments of the historical policy
rate are among the motivations put forward by Rudebusch (2002, pp. 1178-1179) to
justify the lack of power regarding the PA vs. SC test constructed on his nested model.
2sistency of the observed policy rate is due to serially correlated deviations
from the Taylor rate. As far as the Fed is concerned, such deviations could
be due to particular circumnstances, e.g. commodity price scares (1988-89
and 1994-95), credit crunches (1992-93), and ﬁnancial crises (1998-99).4
Söderlind, Söderstrom, and Vredin (2002, SSV henceforth) go a step
further. By working with an AD-AS model, they show that with model con-
sistent rational expectations on the interest rate change, the predictability
of the latter increases as the PA parameter ρ becomes larger. SSV underline
how a high ρ is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition to eﬀectively pre-
dict the policy rate variations; indeed, this predictability also comes from
the high forecastability of variables such as the inﬂation rate and the output
gap level.5 SSV (2002) also verify, with survey data and a small VAR model,
that the predicability of the short term interest rate change is very low (as
also shown by Rudebusch 2002). Then, they conclude that a high degree of
PA cannot co-exist with a standard Taylor rate, given that the latter is com-
posed by highly predictable variables, and this would indeed imply largely
forecastable policy rate changes. In SSV (2002)’s opinion, there might be
an omitted variable problem in the Taylor (1993) rate
v
it deﬁnition. Notice
that, to be consistent with an high degree of PA, this potentially missing
variable should not be easily predictable, because otherwise it would be
rejected by the yield curve indirect test.6
A reply to Rudebusch (2002)’s conjecture is oﬀered by English, Nelson,
and Sack (2002, ENS hereafter). These authors, working on the ﬁrst diﬀer-
ences of the policy rate, show that it is possible to test directly the null of
SC vs. the alternative of PA as determinants of the policy rate historical
path. Their ﬁndings indicate a signiﬁcant role for the latter; nevertheless,
a nested model seems to be suited for capturing the policy rate behavior.
Gerlach-Kristen (2002) also comments on Rudebusch (2002)’s contribution.
4In fact, in drawing the conclusions of his paper, Rudebusch (2002a) acknowledges for
the possibility of ”[...] some intermediate case of partial adjustment, [...] along with some
serially correlated shocks, that is not strictly rejected by the term structure evidence”.
5When SSV (2002) make the hypothesis that both inﬂation and output gap are white
noise, they ﬁnd that the larger the PA coeﬃcient ρ,t h eless predictable future changes
in the policy rate are. This is indeed intuitive, thinking about a sequence of levels of the
interest rate very close to each other; in this case, the predictability of the change of the
policy rate will be very low.
6This last statement ﬁnds its basis on the Rational Expectation Hypothesis, i.e. the
hypothesis that the yield curve is the outcome of a game played by fully rational agents. In
fact, most of the empirical literature reject the expectations model of the term structure.
As an exception on this point, see Favero (2002).
3In her paper she investigates the role of omitted variables in the estimation
of the Taylor rule. By using Kalman ﬁltering, she ﬁnds that both PA and
a ﬁnancial indicator such as the risk-premium are important components in
replicating the observed federal funds rate path.
In this paper we extend ENS (2002)’s analysis along two dimensions.
First, in exploiting their modeling strategy we consider a richer set of al-
ternative Taylor rate deﬁnitions. In particular, we take into account di-
verse, possibly important omitted variables, so capturing the stimuli coming
from Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998, CGG henceforth), Gerlach and Schn-
abel (2000), SSV(2002), Cukierman and Gerlach (2002), Surico (2002), and
Gerlach-Kristen (2002). Second, we focus our attention both on US data
and on EMU variables, in order to gain some insights also on the European
aggregate. As far as the latter is concerned, we are in practice considering
the possibility of estimating Taylor rules for the EMU area, so gaining some
insights regarding the ’average’ European conduct of monetary policy. In
doing so, we have to keep in mind all the possible caveats relative to the use
of aggregated data regarding diﬀerent countries having probably diﬀerent
monetary policy targets, e.g. the inﬂation target. However, we think that
this exercise could be considered as a ﬁrst-order approximation of the track
followed by the EMU aggregate during the last two decades.
Our results indicates that both US and European data largely support
the partial adjustment mechanism hypothesis. Indeed, in the American
case some serial correlation is swept away by embedding in the Taylor rate
deﬁnitions variables proxing asymmetric preferences of the CB on the output
gap, or ﬁnancial indicators. By contrast, a forward looking Taylor rules with
interest rate smoothing turns out to be a satisfactory descriptive model for
EMU.
The structure of the paper reads as follows. In Section 2 we list a few
reasons why a CB might be willing to implement a gradual policy rate path.
Section 3 explains Rudebusch (2002)’s point regarding the conventional wis-
dom on monetary policy inertia. In the same Section, the identiﬁcation
problem aﬀecting a test performed with a model in levels is highlighted, and
English, Nelson, and Sack (2002)’s alternative strategy is described. In Sec-
tion 4 we present the alternative speciﬁcations of the Taylor rate we employ
in our analysis, while in the following Section we discuss our ﬁndings. Then,
in Section 6 we make a qualitative point regarding the ’real time vs. revised’
data discussion which has been very lively in this literature in the past few
years. Section 7 concludes. A Data appendix is included. References follow.
42 Rationalizing monetary policy gradualism
The issue of dynamics is important from a policy perspective. In fact, in the
last two decades we have observed an improvement of the inﬂation-output
gap trade-oﬀ in many industrialized countries. Part of this improvement is
surely attributable to a better monetary-policy management, as remarked
by Cecchetti, Flores Lagunes, and Krause (2001)a n dF a v e r oa n dR o v e l l i
(2003).7 In general, it is important to understand the causes of this success-
ful management, in order to possibly replicate this success in presence of
future, similar macroeconomic conditions. Among these causes, may mon-
etary policy gradualism have played an important role? Recent research in
monetary policy has indicated various possible reasons for a CB to move in
a moderate manner its policy rate. In this section, we quickly discuss some
of them.
Private Sector Expectations
It is well known that, in absence of a commitment technology, the CB
is incapable to manipulate the private sector expectations, due to the time-
inconsistency feature of its promises of ﬁghting inﬂation which renders these
promises non-credible (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). Indeed, this leads the
Society to an inferior level of eﬃciency with respect to that coming from a
solution under commitment, as explained by Rogoﬀ (1985). In studying this
problem, Woodford (1999) suggests the possibility to reduce the gap existing
between these two solutions. He proposes to induce the CB to target an
interest rate smoothing argument, i.e. to control the volatility of the interest
rate change. In doing so, an optimally behaving CB would implement an
inertial interest rate close to the one that it would set under the commitment
scenario. This because the inertia implied by the interest rate smoothing
targeting would have an eﬀect on the economic system through private sector
expectations as if the CB owned a commitment technology.
Parameter Uncertainty
In the real world, monetary policy-making is an exercise undertaken in
an uncertain environment (Goodhart, 1999). Indeed, the CB does face a
7The same authors underline that the improved inﬂation-output gap trade-oﬀ has prob-
ably not been uniquely caused by a better monetary policy management. In fact, there
is a certain evidence of a change in monetary policy preferences, and of more favourable
sequences of supply shocks. Still, better monetary policy management seems to have been
quite signiﬁcant.
5lack of information concerning the monetary transmission mechanism. One
of these uncertainties regard the parameters linking the aggregates which
compose the relevant economic environment the CB is interested into. The
ﬁrst impacting contribution in this context was Brainard (1967)’s. His story
is simple: a CB that is partially ignorant relatively to the key-parameters
of the economy may implement prudent monetary actions when respond-
ing to shocks, since in this way it will reduce the ’uncertainty cost’, i.e.
the possibility of inducing a large volatility in the economy due to a misin-
terpretation of the monetary transmission mechanism.8 Söderstrom (1999)
and Sack (2000) empirically demonstrate that in an optimal control context
with VAR representations of the economic dynamics it is possible to repli-
cate fairly well the federal funds rate path if taking into account parameter
uncertainty.9
Model Uncertainty
McCallum (1999) sustains that a good policy rule is the one that is ca-
pable to perform well across many diﬀerent models. In fact, not only a CB
is uncertain about the key-parameters of the equations formalizing the econ-
omy; indeed, the CB’s uncertainty refers to the formalization of the whole
economic framework. Empirical contributions by Favero and Milani (2001)
and Castelnuovo and Surico (2003), conducted in a class of linear backward
model, show that considering many diverse models may lead the CB to im-
plement a gradual, optimal monetary policy. Indeed, model uncertainty may
be an important component in tracking the CB’s historical policy rate path.
Learning
Does learning enhance gradualism? Sack (1998) shows how a CB that
periodically reﬁnes his estimates of the key-parameters linking the variables
8It should be noticed that in his contribution Brainard (1967) points out how this
result is driven by the low covariance existing between the policy instrument and the state
variables; indeed, a high covariance could overturn the result.
9However, there is not yet a complete agreement on the link between this type of uncer-
tainty and the optimal CB’s behavior. In fact, Söderstrom (2002) suggests that uncertainty
related to the persistence of the inﬂation mechanism may induce CBs to implement an
aggressive strategy, in order to reduce the uncertainty about the future development of
inﬂation. Robust-control oriented works, such as those by Sargent (1999) and Onatski
and Stock (2002) show that the best possible reaction of the CB to the worst-scenario
drawn by the Nature is an aggressive monetary action. Finally, with the use of small scale
models and focusing just on a few key-parameters, Estrella and Mishkin (1999), Peersman
and Smets (1999), and Rudebusch (2001) claim that parameter uncertainty seems not to
have an important impact on the optimally determined feedback rule coeﬃcients.
6of interest in a given framework may choose to act gradually. This result
is due to the stochastic features of the economic dynamics, that render
particularly informative the most recent observations. As a result, the Fed
faces more uncertainty about the reaction of the economy as it moves the
funds rate away from its recent levels.10
Data Uncertainty - Measurement Error
Orphanides (1998) oﬀers an important contribution regarding the noise
aﬀecting the data. His point is intuitive: CB should respond to shocks
gradually, because it is diﬃcult to understand if the one under consideration
is a pure economic shock, or just a measurement error (or a mix between the
two). Indeed, when simple rules à la Taylor (1993) are taken into account,
the increase in volatility caused by measurement errors matters.11
Financial Markets Reaction
A cautious monetary policy may also reﬂect the attention that the CB
poses to the reactions that ﬁnancial markets exert after that a monetary
policy decision has been implemented. In fact, Goodfriend (1991)’s claim is
that markets could over-react to a series of swings of the reference nominal
rate, so negatively aﬀecting the real side of the economy.12
10However, Sack (1998) himself and Wieland (2000) point out that there exist a dynamic
trade-oﬀ between gradualism and learning, i.e. it may become optimal in a dynamic set-
up to implement an aggressive policy in order to learn how the economy react to new,
diﬀerent monetary policy shocks. Indeed, an aggressive policy might speed up the learning
process. Nevertheless, this approach, termed experimentation (see Bertocchi and Spagat,
1993, and Caplin and Leahy, 1996), do not seem to be supported by Policy Makers’ oﬃcial
declarations. In fact, it is worth to mention a comment by a former Vice-Chairman of the
Fed, Alan Blinder (1998, p.11): ”You don’t conduct experiments on a real economy solely
to sharpen your econometric estimates”.
11Notice that this does not hold if we consider the policy rule coming from ﬁrst princi-
ples in a linear-quadratic context. For a formal demonstration of this application of the
certainty equivalence principle, see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, chapter 4).
12An interesting point tackling this view is provided by Cecchetti (2000), who underlines
how large jumps in the policy instrument could be disruptive only if ﬁnancial markets
are relatively certain that it will never happen. If market participants expect that new
information can precipitate large and sudden interest rate changes, then they will defend
themselves by building up institutions in order to avoid any negative consequence. In
his opinion, the only reason that people believe smooth interest rates enhance ﬁnancial
stability is because interest rate has been smooth up to now.
73 Partial adjustment versus serial correlation: A
direct test
Rudebusch (2002) performs an indirect test on the importance of PA versus
SC. He exploits standar term structure regressions in order to show that the
predictive power of the market regarding future changes of the short-term
interest rate over a quarter is very low. Then, Rudebusch’s claim is that
interest rate levels cannot be explained by a large degree of PA, because
this would lead to a easily forecastable variation of the policy rate. In
fact, Rudebusch (2002) also tries to test directly the non-signiﬁcance of the
PA hypothesis. Formally, he builds up an empirical model nesting the PA
speciﬁcation
it =( 1− ρ)
∼
it +ρit−1 + ηt (1)
(ηt = white noise process) with the SC speciﬁcation
it =
∼
it +εt, εt = ρεεt−1 + ηt (2)
(εt =A R ( 1) process).13 The nested model reads as follows:
it =( 1− ρ)
v
it +ρit−1 + εt, εt = ρεεt−1 + ηt (3)
As far as the Taylor rate
∼
it is concerned, Rudebusch concentrates on
two diﬀerent formalizations. The ﬁrst one is the original Taylor (1993) rate,
which reads as follows:
∼
it= c + bπ
_
πt +byyt (4)
where c is a constant,
_
πt= four quarter average inﬂation rate, and yt =
output gap.14 This is a natural benchmark deﬁnition of the Taylor rate.15
13We performed some econometric exercises in order to measure which is the serial
correlation order featuring the residuals of simple backward and forward looking Taylor
rules without smoothing. We did that both with American and with aggregated European
data. Our ﬁndings suggest that an AR(1) process is a good approximation of the errors.
We did not include these ﬁgures in the paper for sake of brevity; however, these ﬁgures
are available upon request.
14The variables deﬁnition may be found in the Data appendix. About the Taylor rate
deﬁnitions, notice that they do not have any error term, since the policy deviations with
respect to the suggested rate are represented in our set up by the vector ηt.





∗ =2 % . Then, the constant c in the various Taylor rates is a linear convolution
8Ad i ﬀerent speciﬁcation of the Tayor rate has been popularized by CGG
(1998,1999,2000). These authors have underlined the importance for the
CB to adjust the policy rate with respect to future, forecast movements of
both inﬂation and output gap. Their idea ﬁnds its rationale in the lags
aﬀecting the monetary policy transmission.16 Their deﬁnition of the Taylor
rate can be captured by the following modelization:
∼
it= c + bπEt−1
_
πt+4 +byEt−1yt (5)
Then, by working with equation (3) and - alternatively - (4) or (5),
Rudebusch (2002) tests ﬁrst for the signiﬁcance of the PA, then for that
on SC. The test suggests rejection neither for PA nor for SC. Why so?
Rudebusch explains that there is an identiﬁcation problem at this point. In
fact, it is very diﬃcult to distinguish between the dynamics deriving from a
PA mechanism and those induced by a SC speciﬁcation when observing at
the realizations of the policy rate, since both these processes (which are very
diﬀerent from an economic standpoint) may induce the same (or similar)
path of the policy rate.17
The importance of the contribution by ENS (2002) relates exactly to this
identiﬁcation issue. They notice that while the two diﬀerent speciﬁcations
(1) and (2) have similar implications for the behavior of the interest rate
level, this similarity does not hold anymore when ﬁrst diﬀerences are taken
into account. To see that, consider equation (1). Making some algebra, it is
possible to arrive to the following formulation:
∆it =( 1− ρ)∆
v
it +(1 − ρ)(
v
it−1 −it−1)+ηt (6)
Diﬀerently, the SC speciﬁcation (2) leads to this alternative equation:
∆it = ∆
v
it +(1 − ρε)(
v
it−1 −it−1)+ηt (7)
The latter equation sheds some light on the implications of the SC engine.
Here, variations of the Taylor-rate cause an immediate and full reaction of
the policy rate change; in fact, there is no inertial adjustment, which is by
of the inﬂation target π
∗ and the real interest rate of equilibrium r
∗,i . e .r
∗ − (bπ − 1)π
∗.
Neither in Rudebusch (2002)’s nor in our study the focus is the one of assessing these
elements; for investigations concentrating on these components, see Judd and Rudebusch
(1998), and Domenéch, Ledo, and Taguas (2002).
16An already ’classical’ reference for the dynamics of the monetary policy transmission
is Christiano, Eichembaum, and Evans (1998).
17See Rudebusch (2002)’s discussion at page 1178.
9contrast present in equation (6) via the coeﬃcient (1−ρ). Then, it is possible







and test the null hypothesis
H0SC : γ2 =1 (9)
Under the null (9), the SC speciﬁcation holds true. Notice that a re-
jection of the null hypothesis has clear economic implications, namely a
rejection of the pure SC hypothesis as the unique driving force of the grad-
u a lp o l i c yr a t ep a t hi m p l e m e n t e db yt h eC B .E N Sv e r i ﬁes that the null is
undoubtly rejected, so supporting a process in which PA plays a signiﬁcant
role.
In fact, there is no reason to belive that only one of the two hypotheses
holds. Indeed, both PA and SC could be important in ﬁtting the actual
monetary policy rate. ENS build up and test a nested structure equiva-
lent to (3), ﬁnding that both PA and SC are supported by the data. So,
even in presence of a SC component the data seem not to discard the PA
speciﬁcation.
To summarize, ENS (2002) tackle the identiﬁcation problem raised by
Rudebusch (2002) and succeed in constructing a test to directly support the
importance of the PA hypothesis in describing the Fed’s decisions during
Greenspan’s regime.
In our positive exercise, we extend ENS’s contribution along two di-
mensions. First, when testing for the PA vs. SC hypotheses, we allow for
diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the Taylor rate. In particular, we consider some
possibly important ’omitted variables’, in order to check if these omissions
are capable to (at least partially) oﬀset the high degree of PA recorded so
far in the literature. The second dimension is the geographical one: We con-
sider both US and EMU data. The latter are weighted data regarding all
the countries belonging to the EMU area, and may serve an approximation
of the monetary policy conduct of the EMU area as a whole. In the next
Section we fully describe our approach, and we comment our ﬁndings.
104 PA versus SC: alternative Taylor rate speciﬁca-
tions
Before exploiting the estimation strategy set up by ENS (2002), we have to
specify the Taylor rate
∼
it. Naturally, we consider the already commented
modelizations (4) and (5). However, as already mentioned above, Rudebusch
(2002) calls for omitted serially correlated variables as potential cause of the
estimated high degree of PA. To check also for this, we enrich the original
speciﬁcation (4) by adding a third regressor, as follows:
v
it= c + bπ
_
πt +byyt + bzzt (10)
In our exercise, the regressor zt plays diﬀerent roles. A variable that we
want to control for is a quadratic transformation of the output gap level, i.e.
zt = y2
t. In doing so we feel inspired by recent works on CBs’ asymmetric
preferences, which imply a non-quadratic representation of their loss func-
tion.18 Many normative analyses conducted so far have relied on a quadratic
formalization of the CB’s penalty function. Indeed, apart from analytical
tractability, there does not seem to be an obvious reason why a CB should
symmetrically target the output gap measure (Blinder, 1997; Goodhart,
1999; Mayer, 2002). With our simple modeling strategy we try to capture
possible asymmetries related to the real object.
We also want to control for the impact of ﬁnancial market conditions.
This seems to be an interesting check, given the lively discussion that has
been taken place for a couple of years now on the attention that the CB
should pose on ﬁnancial markets.19 In particular, z will be a measure of
credit spread, i.e. the spread between corporate and treasury bonds. Guha
and Hiris (2002) empirically demonstrate that this is a counter-cyclical, lead-
ing indicator of macroeconomic business conditions. An economic rationale
for the causality link going from the spread to the business cycle is the credit
channel of monetary policy transmission, formalized ﬁrst by Bernanke and
Blinder (1988), and updated by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke,
18Researchers such as Cukierman and Gerlagh (2002) and Surico (2002) have performed
empirical endeavours along this avenue. See also the references quoted in those papers.
19See for example the two stimulating and opposite views by Bernanke and Gertler
(2001) and Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2002), and the citations therein. Notice
that in their discussion the key variable taken into account as indicator of the ﬁnancial
markets conditions is the asset prices misalignements. Instead, in our empirical exercise
we work with the credit spread, as done by Gerlach-Kristen (2002).
11Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996).20
When considering the EMU, we take up the suggestion in CGG (1998)
and Gerlach and Schnabel (2000), and we also add variables such as money
(M3) growth, the federal funds rate, and the Euro/US dollar exchange rate.
The monetary aggregate M3 was important before the creation of EMU
(CGG, 1998) and it is one of the two pillars of ECB’s monetary strategy
now.21 The latter two components (federal funds rate, Euro/$ exchange
rate) may proxy ’external pressures’ aﬀecting Euroland.
Our exercise aims primarily at testing the PA vs. SC hypothesis. To do
so, we ﬁrst estimate equation (8) with the Taylor rate alternatively speciﬁed
as (4), (5), and (10). As a second step, we estimate the nested model (3),
so admitting both the hypotheses, in order to assess if there is room for
a ’joint signiﬁcance’. Given Rudebusch (2002)’s sample choice, we employ
the sample 1987Q1-1999Q4 for analyzing the US policy rule. Instead, we
consider the time-span 1980Q1-2000Q4 when investigating the EMU area.
We adopt a Non Linear Square estimator in models without expectations
( i . e .w h e n( 4 )a n d( 10) are considered), while GMM when (5) is taken into
account. Our results and a discussion follow.
5 Findings
We now present our ﬁndings. First, we discuss our results relative to the
US; then, we pass to the European ones. A comparison between these two
sets of results concludes this Section.
20In brief, the credit channel works as follows. Suppose to be in a good moment for
the economy. Current income is high, and expectations are positive. Then, investors
are willing to buy proﬁtable shares; as a consequence, asset prices raise. This improves
the situation of the ﬁrms’ balance sheets, and imply an easier access to banks’ loans, on
average. The larger collateral available guarantees also more favourable rates on these
loans for the ﬁrms. As a consequence, ﬁrms need to raise less funds via their corporate
bonds, then returns on those bonds will be lower. This tightens the credit spread, and
triggers (with some lags) the economic boost. However, at some point this boom in
economic activities will become inﬂationary. The CB will react raising the real interest
rates, so proﬁts and expectations will turn down. This implies a reduction of the asset
prices, so of the collateral that ﬁrms may provide to banks. This will induce banks to
augment their returns on loans, so ﬁrms will have to switch toward other ﬁnancial channels,
e.g. corporate bonds. The increase in the latter’s yields will enlarge the credit spread,
while the cycle starts declining.
21For a discussion on the role of M3 in the ECB’s monetary policy strategy, see Masuch,
Nicoletti Altimari, Pill, and Rostagno (2002).
125.1 Results on the US
Table 1 collects our ﬁndings regarding the PA versus SC test run with US
data.22 A few remarks are worthwhile. First of all, the values and the signif-
icance of the parameters bπ and by seem to be robust across speciﬁcations.
In particular, the elasticity of the policy rate with respect to inﬂation is
statistically in line with the value posed by Taylor (1993), with the only
exception being represented by the Forward Looking rule.23 However, also
the latter shows a point estimate bigger than one, so conﬁrming the fact
that Greenspan’s conduct of monetary policy has tended to stabilize inﬂa-
tion volatility. The point-estimates for by are slightly larger than the value
proposed by Taylor, but are roughly in line with those obtained by Judd
and Rudebusch (1998), Kozicki (1999), Amato and Laubach (1999), and
Rudebusch (2002). Moreover, the parameter bz turns out to be statistically
signiﬁcant and having the expected sign. In the ﬁrst case, this seems to oﬀer
a support for the ’asymmetric preferences’ conjecture pushed by Cukierman
and Gerlach (2002) and Surico (2002); in fact, the negative sign related to
the quadratic output gap measure in the Taylor rate indicates an histori-
cally milder response by the CB when the level of actual output was over
its potential than when it was under it. Our ﬁndings just reinforce this
conjecture.
As far as the credit spread indicator is concerned, there seems to be a
particularly negative reaction of the policy rate to an increase of our risk-
indicator. This conﬁrms the ’ﬁnancial markets inﬂuence’ put forward by
Gerlach-Kristen (2002); indeed, our coeﬃcient is statistically equivalent to
that obtained in Gerlach-Kristen’s investigation.24 A c c o r d i n gt ot h e
_
R2
22A note of cautious in evaluating our ﬁndings is needed. Our econometric estimates
rely on the assumption of stationarity of the series at hand. In fact, as far as some of
the series employed here are concerned, the null of unit root turns out to be very hard
to reject when a standard augmented Dickey-Fuller test is employed. However, it is well
known that the Dickey-Fuller test is not very reliable in short sample analyses.
23In fact, a standard Wald test cannot reject the restriction bπ =1 .5 for none of the
estimated backward looking Taylor rules. Nevertheless, a bit of cautiousness is necessary
here, given the large estimated standard deviations, probably due to the small sample at
hand.
24Notice that there might be an endogeneity problem here. In fact, variations of the
dependent variable (short term interest rate) are likely to inﬂuence all the term structure















































R2 0.954 0.919 0.965 0.979
H0 : γ2 =1
(Wald test, p−value)
0.002∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗















in the others. zt = y2
t (Asymmetric preferences); zt =spread (Credit spread). Estimates

















t four quarter inﬂation from the Producer Price Index (Finished Goods).
J-test for ov.-ident. restr.(χ2(12)) returned a p-value = 0.78.
NW correction applied to the standard errors (reported in brackets).




refers to the level of the federal funds rate.
Table 1: Test for PA versus SC: US data
14statistic, the descriptive power of all the models employed seems to be high.
For our purposes, the most important column of Table 1 is the last one,
where we collect all the p-values concerning the Wald test on the null (9).
Robustly enough, the null is rejected at the 99% conﬁdence level for all
the four cases under investigation, so discarding SC as the unique ex-post
descriptive mechanism of the federal funds rate path. This result is in line
with ENS (2002)’s ﬁndings, and casts some doubts on Rudebusch (2002)’s
position.
So far we have run a ’either-or’ test. Nevertheless, the policy rate may
have been historically determined by both PA and SC. Therefore, we also es-
timate the encompassing model (3) in order to assess if these hypotheses are
jointly important from a positive standpoint. Our results are presented in
Table 2. First of all, the signiﬁcance of all the regressors in the Taylor rules
is conﬁrmed. Notably, the coeﬃcient bπ is now in line with Taylor (1993)’s
assessment also when the Forward Looking speciﬁcation is employed. More-
over, point-estimates of the parameter bπ are now much closer each other.
Also with this encompassing speciﬁcation, the additional regressor zt turns
out to be quite relevant in ﬁtting the path of the federal funds rate. As far
as our key-parameters ρ and ρε are concerned, while estimates of the for-
mer suggest that the PA hypothesis is not rejected by the data, much more
uncertainty surrounds the latter. Indeed, when the Standard Taylor rate or
the Forward Looking one are employed, there is a strong evidence of serial
correlation in the estimated residuals. This coeﬃcient is still signiﬁcant (but
not anymore at 99% level of conﬁdence) when we consider the Taylor rule
with ’asymmetric’ output gap. By contrast, the speciﬁcation of the Taylor
rule with credit spread seems to delete the relevance of the AR(1)m o d e lo f
the error term at the standard 95% level of statistical conﬁdence. Figure 1
shows the remarkable ﬁto b t a i n e dw i t ht h eP Am o d e l( 3 ) , ( 10) with credit
s p r e a d ,i . e .am o d e lw i t hρε =0 . Then, although Rudebusch’s position does
not seem to acknowledge any possible link between omitted variables in the
speciﬁc a t i o no ft h eT a y l o rr a t ea n dt h es i g n i ﬁcance of the SC coeﬃcient ρε,
think that the timing of this feedback still preserves our estimates from the unconsistency
threat. Moreover, the estimated sign of the credit spread coeﬃcient turns out to be in
line with our expectations. However, we also run 2SLS estimations in order to control for








πt−1 yt−1 spreadt−2 it−1]. Indeed, also these estimates are clearly















































R2 0.965 0.937 0.970 0.980
∗=95%/∗∗= 9 9 %r e j e c t i o no ft h en u l lh y p . E s t i m a t e dm o d e l :
it =( 1-ρ)(c+bπf(
_










f(yt)=yt in the others. zt = y2
t (Asymmetric preferences); zt =spread (Credit spread).

















t four quarter inﬂation from the Producer Price Index (Finished Goods).
J-test for ov.-ident. restr.(χ2(12)) returned a p-value = 0.91.
NW correction applied to the stand. errors (reported in brackets). c omitted for brevity.
Table 2: Nested PA-SC model: US data
our results point toward that direction.25
5.2 Findings for the EMU area
The use on synthetic variables for the EMU area
In analyzing the EMU area, we undertake our empirical exercise by em-
ploying synthetic, aggregated indicators. These synthetic measures are con-
structed as GDP weighted average of the 11 individual countries considered
25Rudebusch (2002)’s position about this argument is expressed in his footnote no. 32,
page 1182: ”Rules 1 and 2 [i.e. with a Taylor rate respectively like our ’Standard Taylor
’and ’Forward Looking’ formulation (our note)] may appear too parsimonious so that
the persistent deviations reﬂect a serially correlated omitted variable; however, as noted
above, the empirical reaction function literature, including monetary VARs, has placed
the proverbial kitchen sink on the right-hand side in attempts to explain the policy rate,


























Figure 1: PA model with credit spread for the US
17in this analysis.26 The choice of using aggregated data is due to the will of
comparing results obtained for the Euro area as a whole with those for the
US; in fact, these two areas look quite similar, at least in terms of economic
size and relative importance of external trade (Rudebusch and Svensson,
2002). Moreover, as underlined by Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2003), since
the early 80s many European countries have taken a concerted eﬀort to
ﬁght inﬂation. Although some breaks may be clearly identiﬁed in this pat-
tern (e.g. ERM crisis in 1992), a common eﬀort to bring down inﬂation
to more sustainable levels has been implemented for long time, and contin-
ued with under the monetary policy management by the European Central
Bank. Then, the use of synthetic data may be informative on the policy
followed by most of the EMU countries in recent years. To some extent,
this seems to be a widespread view in recent research; in fact, economic
analyses with synthetic data have been performed, among the others, by
Taylor (1999), Peersman and Smets (1999), Gerlach and Schnabel (2000),
Doménech, Ledo, and Taguas (2002), and Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2003).27
We think synthetic data may indeed provide us with a rough approximation
of a descriptive rule suited for the Euro Area. However, the creation of syn-
thetic data involves the aggregation of diﬀerent series whose dynamics are
somehow heterogeneous. Moreover, the hypothesis is the one of estimating
rules followed by a ’ﬁctious’ Central Bank. Then, while presenting these
results, we acknowledge that the same should be taken with a grain of salt.
EMU area: Results
In analyzing the EMU area, we consider a Taylor rule with and with-
out expectations, and we also investigate for possible asymmetries in the
reaction to output gap variations.28 Moreover, we take into account some
proxies for external pressures and domestic concerns that might have had
26The countries considered in our analysis are the following: Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, The Netherlands. The
deﬁnition of the series employed here is proposed in the Data appendix. I thank Barbara
Roﬃa for having provided me with the data.
27Taylor (1999) bases his estimates on a weighted GDP and inﬂation for an aggregate
of Germany, France, and Italy, for the sample period 1971Q1-1994Q4. Peersman and
Smets (1999) consider synthetic series built upon Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and
the Netherlands, for the sample 1975Q1-1997Q4. Doménech, Ledo, and Taguas (2002)’s
estimates refer to 11 European countries - the same considered in our analysis - for the
sample 1970Q1-1999Q4. Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) consider 10c o u n t r i e s-t h es a m eo f
our analysis but Luxemburg - for the sample 1990Q1-1998Q4. Finally, Gerdesmeier and
Roﬃa (2003) analyze the whole EMU-area for the sample 1985M1-2002M2.
28As far as the credit spread is concerned, there has been a developed ﬁnancial market
18an impact on the European monetary policies. In particular, we consider
the US $/EURO(ECU) nominal exchange rate and the nominal M3 growth
rate.29
Our estimates for the Euro area conﬁrm the importance of the PA mech-
anism in explaining the dynamics of the short term policy rate. Table 3
display the results stemming from the implementation of the ENS test. No-
tably, the null (9) is strongly rejected with all the diﬀerent speciﬁcations
of the Taylor rate considered. Interestingly enough, almost all the point
estimates of the inﬂation coeﬃcient bπ suggest that the European monetary
authorities have implemented a fairly tight conduct of the monetary policy
during the last two decades. Indeed, all these simple feedback rules ﬁnd in
the output gap measure a signiﬁcant regressor, so conﬁrming also for the
European area the goodness of the Taylor (1993) descriptive scheme.30
Interestingly enough, the ENS scheme leads to a robust rejection of the
null of SC mechanism also for the European analysis. This result, equal to
what obtained for the US, seems to support the conventional wisdom on the
monetary policy gradualism.
Table 4 reports some estimates of the nested model (3). Remarkably,
the ﬁndings reported here suggest that monetary policies implemented in
just for a few years, and mainly in Germany and France. Then, the construction of a
measure of credit spread for the Euro area is not straightforward. We ran test-regressions
by taking into account the German credit spread (available from 1990 on) and the formerly
used US one. None of them turned out to be signiﬁcant.
29The US $/EURO(ECU) exchange rate has been considered in deviations with respect
to its sample mean. Apart from the results we present here, we also obtained other ﬁgures
concerning regressions with addictional variables such as the deviations of the log of M3
with respect to a log-linear trend with drift, the contemporaneous federal funds rate,
and the lagged one. None of these addictional variables turned out to be statistically
signiﬁcant.
30A consideration has to be made here. If we think about the CB’s problem as an
optimal control problem featured by a loss function and some constraints representing the
economic dynamics, then the coeﬃcient by is a convolution of the CB’s preferences and
the structural parameters of the economy. An estimated positive value for by does not
necessarily suggest a positive weight for the output gap in the CB’s loss function; indeed,
it might have been important as leading indicator for the future european inﬂation, as
underlined by Peersman and Smets (1999). We recall here that our output gap measure
is just a statistical measure, i.e. it is the residual of a regression having the log of GDP
as dependent variable, and a constant and a polynomial in time as explanatory variables.
For a much more careful estimation of the output gap in the EMU area, undertaken by



























































R2 0.976 0.977 0.975 0.976 0.977
H0 : γ2 =1
(Wald test, p−value)
0.002∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000















in the others. zt = y2
t ;o rz t=nominal exchange rate in deviations from its sample mean;
or zt=nominal M3 growth rate. Estimates performed via GMM for the forward looking rule;

















t is the four
quarter inﬂation from the HICP index . J-test for ov.-ident. restr.(χ2(11))
returned a p-value = 0.82. NW correction applied to the stand. errors (in brackets).




refers to the level of the federal funds rate.
Table 3: Test for PA versus SC: EMU data
20Europe during the ’80s and ’90s may be described by a standard Taylor rule
with smoothing. In fact, all the addictional regressors considered here turn
out to impact the short term policy rate with the right sign, but without
owning statistical relevance. Indeed, this is in line with what found by
Peersman and Smets (1999) and Gerlach and Schnabel (2000).31
Very much like in the previous US analysis, our nested model for Europe
tends to conﬁrm the coexistence of PA and SC in determining the policy
rate path. A notable exception is represented by the forward looking rule
(5). In fact, no trace of SC is detected there. Figure 2 reports the actual
vs. ﬁtted policy rate suggested by this rule.
5.3 Robustness check across regions
We brieﬂy review here our empirical ﬁndings. First, according to the ENS
ﬁrst-diﬀerence model, the presence of the PA component in a positive model
f o rt h ep o l i c yr a t es e e m st ob es u p p o r t e db yb o t hU Sa n dE M Ud a t a .S e c -
ond, there is trace of serial correlation in the policy shocks. However, in the
US case this may be due to omitted variables such as the squared output gap
(indicator of asymmetric preferences) or the credit spread (leading indicator
of the business cycle). When these variables are added to the regression the
statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient ρε substantially decreases. On the
contrary, the role of omitted variable seems not to be central when European
data are taken into account. Interestingly, a forward looking Taylor rule à
la CGG (1998) turns out to be suﬃcient for fully taking into account the
persistence of the short term policy rate.
Overall, the standard explanatory variables of the Taylor regressions (i.e.
inﬂation and output gap) are robustly signiﬁcant and with the expected signs
and magnitudes (i.e. bπ > 1, by > 0) for both the US and EMU.
31Instead, these ﬁndings seem to be at odds with those in CGG (1998), whose inves-
tigated sample spans from 1979 up to 1993. One reason for this diﬀerent ﬁndings may
rely on the diﬀerent data at hand: National in CGG’s case, aggregate in ours. Moreover,
a plausible explanation for this contrasting result may be the fact that the Maastricht
T r e a t y ,s i g n e du pi n1992, forced all the signatory countries to implement tight monetary
and ﬁscal policies in order to quickly converge toward the Maastricht criteria. Then, al-
though important, external pressures have necessarily been replaced by domestic concerns,



























































R2 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.981
∗=95%/∗∗= 9 9 %r e j e c t i o no ft h en u l lh y p . E s t i m a t e dm o d e l :
it =( 1-ρ)(c+bπf(
_










in the others. zt = y2
t ;o rz t=nominal exchange rate in deviations from its sample mean;
or zt=nominal M3 growth rate. Estimates performed via GMM for the forward looking rule;

















t is the four
quarter inﬂation from the HICP index . J-test for ov.-ident. restr.(χ2(11))
returned a p-value = 0.78. NW correction applied to the stand. errors (in brackets).




refers to the federal funds rate level.































Figure 2: PA forward looking model for the EMU area
236 A note on real time data analyses
In this paper we use revised data; in fact, these data were not available to
t h eF e do rt h eE C Bw h e nt h e yh a dt ot a k et h e i rd e c i s i o n s .W h a ti fw eu s e d
real time data? Lansing (2002) simulates a model in which a CB sets the
policy rate without any smoothing, and on the basis of real time estimates
of the potential output. In Lansing’s study, the measurement error regard-
ing the potential output estimates is serially correlated, because monetary
authorities need time to learn about the new potential output process af-
ter that a shock has occurred. Lansing discusses how an econometrician
who used ﬁnal, revised data would obtain upward biased estimates of the
parameter ρ relative to the true value, because the lagged interest rate cap-
tures the omitted, serially correlated, measurement error. Indeed, Lansing
(2002)’s conclusions support Rudebusch (2002)’s claim on the massive rel-
ative importance of SC versus PA. Mehra (2001) also supports Rudebusch
(2002)’s ﬁndings. In particular, he works with real time data, and estimates
the potential output as a simple log-linear trend of the GDP. His estimates
of the partial adjustment coeﬃcient are indeed low, and sometimes even not
signiﬁcant.
Then, are our results misleading? In fact, the impact of real time data
on the estimated value of the smoothing parameter is still disputed. Perez
(2001) and Orphanides (2001) estimate Taylor rules with real time data, and
still obtain high estimated ﬁgures regarding the interest rate smoothing co-
eﬃcients.32 Moreover, in estimating the nested model (3) we explicitly allow
for a serially correlated error term. This choice, not frequently taken in this
literature, should enable us to catch the omitted variable eﬀect highlighted
by Lansing (2002).
Therefore, from a quantitative point of view, the use of revised data
does not necessarily lead to dramatic consequences for our results.33 Here,
we would like to stress the fact that the autoregressive coeﬃcient ρ could
indeed have a lower magnitude with respect to the standard assessment of
0.8. However, this does not necessarily imply that the Fed has not smoothed
their policy rates; indeed, it could be the case that the sluggishness discussed
32Notice that Lansing (2002) and Mehra (2001)f o c u so nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t es m o o t h i n g
value in the policy rule estimation. Instead, Perez (2001)’s paper regards the (non) accom-
modativeness of the monetary policy in the ’70s, while Orphanides (2001) concentrates on
the diﬀerent policy recommendations arising when using revised vs. real time data.
33About the smoothing parameter, a similar point is made by Brüggemann and Thorn-
ton (2002).
24so far in the literature is not so high, but it is still present.
7 Conclusions
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ef o c u s s e do u ra t t e n t i o no nt h ei n t e r e s tr a t es m o o t h -
ing argument in Taylor-type schemes. In a recent contribution, Rudebusch
(2002) challenges the conventional wisdom, and state that the interest rate
smoothing at quarterly level is just an illusion. As an indirect proof, he
claims that if this was not the case, then rational agents should be capable
to predict future movements of the policy rate. Indeed, this is not what it
happens in reality.
By applying the English, Nelson, and Sack (2002) modeling strategy to
the US and EMU, we have estimated the signiﬁcance of both the interest
rate smoothing argument and the serially correlated policy deviations from
the Taylor rate prescriptions. This ﬁnding, robust across diﬀerent speciﬁ-
cations of the Taylor rate, casts some doubts on Rudebusch (2002)’s claim
concerning monetary policy inertia at quarterly frequencies.
An analysis conducted by considering a nested model conﬁrms that the
Fed has historically moved the policy rate in a cautions manner. On the con-
trary, there are some doubts regarding the importance of serially correlated
deviations from the Taylor rate in ﬁtting the data. In fact, the statistical
signiﬁcance of the SC mechanism might be spurious and due to omitted
variables such as the quadratic output gap or a measure of risk premium.
Once one of these two regressors is considered, the serial correlation of the
error term turns out to be markedly lower. However, it should be noticed
that the introduction of a third regressor in the Taylor rate has a negative
impact on the magnitude of the degree of PA. This suggest that the mone-
tary authorities act gradually, but probably respond faster than claimed in
the literature to shocks aﬀecting the economy.
About the EMU area, our estimates suggest that a forward looking Tay-
lor rule with interest rate smoothing may very well explain the policy rate
path in the ’80s and ’90s. However, as a general indication it seems to be
important to shape the error term as an autoregressive process, in order to
take into account potentially serially correlated policy deviations.
Although not deﬁnitive, our empirical ﬁndings seem to support the
search for other important explanatory variables to be included into Taylor
type regressions. Asymmetric policy preferences (Cukierman and Gerlach,
2002, and Surico, 2002) and ﬁnancial indicators (Gerlach-Kristen, 2002)
25s e e mt ob ew o r t ho ff u r t h e ri n v e s t i g a t i o nb o t hf r o map o s i t i v ea n df r o ma
normative side, also in the light of some recent contributions on asymmetries
i nt h eC B ’ sl o s sf u n c t i o na n di n ﬂationary bias (Cukierman and Muscatelli,
2002, and Surico, 2003), and on the importance of the ﬁnancial markets for
the monetary authorities (Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani, 2002).
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26Data appendix
The variables used in our study have been constructed as follows: πt
is the four-quarter inﬂation rate computed via the price index (Pt), i.e.
πt ≡ 4(pt − pt−1),w h e r ept =1 0 0 l n Pt.y t is the output gap, which has
been deﬁned as qt − q∗
t, where qt ≡ 100lnQt, while q∗
t ≡ 100lnQ∗
t.F i -
nally, the upper-barred variables indicate simple averages taken over the
contemporaneous observation and the previous three lags of the variable in
consideration.
US data description and source
The short term rate used in our analysis is the federal funds rate. The
quarterly inﬂation rate has been computed by using the GDP chain-weighted
price index. Our measure of output is the chain weighted real GDP. The
potential output series is the one estimated by the Congressional Budget Of-
ﬁce. The credit spread has been built as the diﬀerence between the Moody’s
BAA corporate index yield and the 10-year US treasury note yield.
All the series used in this analysis are downloadable from the Federal Re-
serve Bank of St. Louis web site, i.e. http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
EMU data description and source
Policy rate: weighted average of euro-11 short-term interest rates. Weights:
GDP weights at ppp exchange rates in 2001. National series are from BIS,
3-month money market interest rates (from the Small Green Book) linked
to EURIBOR (from Reuters) from 1999 onwards.
Pt =1 0 0∗ QNt/Qt,1995 = 100, where
QNt = EU-11 national series on seasonally adjusted nominal GDP (’stocks’)
at market prices (for more details on sources and methodology for the in-
dividual countries data see memo from DG-S (Erikos Velisaratos and Björn
Fischer) ”Data request: Historical data for the Euro area used in monetary
analysis constructed using diﬀerent aggregation methods”) are added after
they have been converted to euro via the irrevocable ﬁxed conversion rates
of 31 December 1998 (and, in the case of Greece, determined on 19J u n e
2000). Adjusted for german uniﬁcation - millions of euro - ESA95 data to the
widest extend possible. The quarterly growth rates calculated from this EU-
11 GDP series have been used to extend backwards the EU-12G D Ps e r i e s-
available in the ESA95 database - from 2000Q4 back to 1980Q1.T h eq u a r -
terly data are distributed to a monthly frequence (via convert(cubic,end) —
interpolation).
Qt = National series on real GDP (’stocks’) at constant prices (for more
details on sources and methodology for the individual countries data see
memo from DG-S (Erikos Velisaratos and Björn Fischer) ”Data request:
Historical data for the Euro area used in monetary analysis constructed using
diﬀerent aggregation methods”) are added after they have been rebased
t oac o m m o nb a s ey e a r( 1995) and converted to euro via the irrevocable
ﬁxed conversion rates of 31st December 1998 (and, in the case of Greece,
determined on 19 June 2000). Adjusted for german uniﬁcation. Millions
27of euro. The quarterly data are distributed to a monthly frequence (via
convert(cubic,end) — interpolation).
Q∗
t =Potential output computed as the residual of the regression of
log(Qt) on a constant and a quadratic trend.
US/EURO(ECU) nominal exchange rate: From BIS — code mQK-
BAus02. Exchange rate USD/1EURO(ECU), spot at 2.15 PM (CET) M-
average.
M3: Adjusted stock (millions of euro). The seasonally adjusted index of
adjusted stocks from the ECB database is rebased to January 2001 = 100
a n dm u l t i p l i e db yt h es e a s o n a l l ya d j u s t e ds t o c ko fM 3i nJ a n u a r y2 0 0 1.T h e
percentage change between any two dates (after October 1997) corresponds
to the change in the aggregate excluding the eﬀect of reclassiﬁcations, other
revaluations or exchange variations (and from January 2001 excluding the
eﬀect of the enlargement), etc... Adjusted for non-euro area residents’ hold-
ings of all negotiable instruments.
All the data series have been provided by the Monetary Policy Strategy
Division at the European Central Bank.
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